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BOOK REVIEWS
THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-

By Barkleq Clark. Warren, Gorham & Lamont:
Boston, Massachusetts 1980 (with 1982 Supplement).
MERCIAL CODE.

Reviewed by Professor Wijfredo Caraballo *
Creating a volume which can be used as a research aid by many
who have common interests but differing perspectives poses a major
challenge for the source book author. With legal source books the
writer must contend with law students new to the subject, law professors teaching classes, practitioners structuring financing arrangements and judges seeking specific solutions. Professor Barkley Clark's
The Law of Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code1 successfully meets the needs of this highly diverse audience.
Professor Clark's book analyzes and explains Article Nine of the
Uniform Commercial Code. The UCC is relatively new, 2 and Article
Nine supersedes all previous security devices in personal property
and fixtures.3 Understanding the article's structure and methodology becomes important when undertaking an excursion through Article Nine since the perspective of the searcher will influence the
analysis throughout. Thus, the four primary categories of users-law
students, law teachers, practitioners (usually attorneys), and judgeswill have different needs.
An example of these diverging needs can be seen in a transaction
which touches several jurisdictions. The basic question is simple:
which jurisdiction's laws govern? An incorrect answer to this question leaves the creditor without the full protection afforded by Article
Associate Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law; J.D. New York University,

*

1974; B.A. St. Joseph's College, Yonkers, 1969.

1 B.

CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-

CIAL CODE (1980 & Supp. 1982).
2 Pennsylvania, the first state to adopt the Uniform Commercial Code, did so in 1953,
effective July 1, 1954.
3 U.C.C. § 9-102(1) states:
Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-104 on excluded transactions, this Article
applies:
(a) To any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a
security interest in personal property or fixtures including goods, documents, instruments, general intangibles, chattel paper or accounts; and also
(b) To any sale of accounts or chattel paper.
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Nine. 4 The law teacher will lead the student through the various
sections that need to be analyzed to answer the jurisdiction question.
Both student and teacher focus on the operations involved in determining which law governs. The practitioner's paramount concern,
on the other hand, is to do whatever it takes to best protect the client.
In many instances, the practitioner will conclude that as a practical
matter, this requires following the rules of all jurisdictions the transaction touches. The judge, by way of contrast, will look at the parties' actions to determine both the appropriate jurisdiction and the
correct result under that jurisdiction's law.
Commentators in the area of commercial law are hard put to
satisfy these diverse interests. Many have tried; few have actually
succeeded. The hornbook by James J. White and Robert Summers, 5
which has met with widespread popularity and acclaim, 6 has been
the most successful venture thus far. Indeed, until now, this book has
been without strong competition. In my opinion they have, for Article Nine, met their match in The Law of Secured Transactions Under the
Uniform Commercial Code by Barkley Clark.
Professor Clark tells us that his book "is aimed at those who deal
in personal property security interests, both commercial and consumer" (p. iii) (emphasis added). Although this sentence appears to
narrow the scope of his book to the practitioner's world, the actual
scope is quite expansive. Professor Clark has done an excellent job of
providing sufficient information and explanation for all, regardless of
their perspective.
The book is divided into four parts (plus appendices ranging
from excerpts of statutes relevant to secured transactions to state variations in Article Nine).
Part One, entitled "Elements of the Security Interests," starts off
with "Aids to Interpreting Article Nine" (pp. 1-3 to 1-8) and then
proceeds to probe Article Nine and all of its nuances. Clark designed
Part One's approach illustrate Article Nine's methodology. The concepts are carefully unraveled and developed with numerous hy4

An example of a multi-state problem is as follows:
Bank in State X makes a loan to Debtor, against equipment that Debtor has in her
store in State X. Debtor also owns a store in State Y (of the same type as that in
State X). Bank perfects its security interest in State X. Debtor removes the collateral subject to the security interest to her store in State Y.
Q. Does Bank's security interest in State X extend to State Y?

5

J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-

MERCIAL CODE (2d ed. 1980).
6 Cohen, Book Review, 10 S.H.U. L. REv. 981, 981 (1980); Peters, Book Review, 71
MICH. L. REv. 1487 (1973); Clark, Book Review, 58 CORNELL L. Q. 1273 (1973).
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potheticals used to demonstrate the Article Nine approach to
problem solving.
Part One best addresses students' needs and perspective. Professor Clark, in great detail, lays out the fundamentals in such a way
that the student should be able to work through Article Nine without
much conceptual difficulty. For example, standard forms are reproduced so that the student can see what a financing statement actually
looks like (pp. 2-31, 2-75). Professor Clark has done such a thorough
job for the law student that his book might discourage students from
the traditional classroom model of learning. I say this partly in jest,
and partly seriously, for the teacher who assigns this book for his or
her course would be hard pressed to supplement it in the classroom.
An example of Professor Clark's discussion of the attachment requirement in perfecting the security interest 7 illustrates his skill in
describing fundamental concepts (p. 2-3). As a teacher, I have found

attachment to be a very difficult concept for students.8 Without an
understanding of this foundation concept, students usually find it almost impossible to develop subsequent concepts. The author addresses this problem as follows:
Some creditors have a difficult time understanding the difference
between "attachment" and "perfection." A good example is the
confusion of the lender in KansasState Bank v. Overseas Motosport, Inc.,

involving a purchase money loan to enable the debtor to buy a new
motorcycle. The borrower executed a security agreement in favor
of the bank, but the bank failed to get its lien noted on the certificate of title. When the debtor skipped town with his new motorcycle, the bank failed to go after him because it assumed that failure
to note the lien left it without any enforceable security interest. In
fact, the bank could have repossessed the motorcycle even in the
absence of perfection, since the security interest had attached. The
failure to perfect only affected the bank's rights as against third
parties. In the case at hand, there were no third parties, such as a
trustee in bankruptcy, or an innocent purchaser, who laid claim to
the motorcycle. The bank simply goofed in assuming that failure to
perfect made the security interest unenforceable as against the
debtor himself. Under both versions of Article Nine, when the
debtor signed the security agreement, the bank was left with an
7 U.C.C. § 9-303(l) states: "A security interest is perfected when it has attached and
when all of the applicable steps required for perfection have been taken. . . ." An example
of a step required is filing a financing statement; U.C.C. § 9-203(1) states that attachment
occurs when there is a 1) written security agreement (proper as to form), 2) value is given by
the secured creditor, 3) "the debtor has rights in the collateial."
8 The difficulty, in my experience, is that most students expect that attachment is something tangible, instead of a state of affairs. Once all of the requirements of U.G.C. § 9-203(1)
are satisfied attachment simply "is."
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"attached" security interest, enforceable against the debtor (p. 2-4)
(footnotes omitted).
This paragraph marvelously elucidates the importance of attachment, both as a concept independent of perfection and as the
precondition for perfection. The importance of attachment as an enforceability concept irrespective of third parties' rights comes
through loud and clear.
Part One also reflects the practitioner's perspective. Professor
Clark provides eleven "typical clauses" (pp. 2-9 to 2-11) found in
security agreements and, in addition, gives advice on how to adjust
each to provide for the uniqueness of some transactions (p. 2-11). In
another section, Professor Clark provides fourteen examples of what
constitutes default (p. 4-5), making it eminently clear that the practitioner must take care to define default to fit the particular transaction. This section on default is particularly well designed, replete
with sound advice (pp. 4-7 to 4-9) and in-depth analyses of the
problems facing a secured creditor upon default by the debtor, including the various constitutional issues which may arise (p. 4-31).
Professor Clark's analysis of the various options available to the secured creditor upon default includes not only those arising directly
from Article Nine but also several based on common sense and good
business judgment. Each option is separately analyzed with a view
to laying out its strengths and weaknesses and any judicial reactions
(§§ 4.4-4.6 and 4.7 beginning at p. 4-24).
Throughout Part One (and other parts as well), Professor Clark
endeavors to blend the relevant case law into his analysis. Professor
Clark does not hesitate to be critical of a decision, as when he dubs
one case "the World's Worst U.C.C. Decision" (p. 3-67). His analysis
should aid the judiciary since he not only criticizes decisions but also
recommends what he considers to be better results with appropriate
support for his conclusions (p. 3-67). In general, Professor Clark has
not satisfied himself with simply laying out Article Nine and citing
the relevant case law; instead, he has affirmatively ferretted out some
of the more difficult problems.
In most cases, Professor Clark does a very good job of contending with the difficult questions. In one instance, however, he disposes
of a problem in a manner which is in my opinion incomplete. Section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code insulates "buyers in
the ordinary course of business" from security interests on goods they
have purchased. 9 This section enables, for example, retail buyers to
9 U.C.C. § 9-307(1) states:
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receive merchandise free of a security interest to which it may have
been subject to as "inventory." However, the language of § 9-307(1)
provides only that the buyer takes free of security interests "created
by his seller." Professor Clark argues that the "created by seller" language is an "exception to the rule of § 9-307(1), which in general
protects the reliance interest of a good-faith buyer from a dealer" (p.
3-24). He intends the following example to show how a serious problem for the consumer is created by the language of § 9-307(1):
Bank takes a security interest in all of Dealer-l's appliances, and
files a financing statement with the Secretary of State. Dealer-1
wrongfully sells his inventory in (bulk) to Dealer-2. Consumers buy
appliances from Dealer-2 (p. 3-23).
Professor Clark correctly states that, since Dealer-2 did not create the security interest, the consumer takes subject to the security
interest of the bank which may now replevy the appliance from the
consumer (p. 3-23). By inserting the fact that the sale from Dealer-1
to Dealer-2 was wrongful, Professor Clark has misleadingly given the
impression that the result depends. on the wrongfulness of the sale.
For example, the sale could be of a large number of appliances by a
manufacturer to a retailer. Assuming that the security interest was
created by the manufacturer, the retailer takes free of the bank's security interest by operation of § 9-307(1).10 But is the consumer who
buys from the retailer protected from the bank? Section 9-207 does
not appear to help the consumer since the retailer did not create the
security interest. Section 9-307 does not require the concept of a
wrongful sale.
Professor Clark would protect the consumer in his hypothetical,
and I assume in mine as well, by resorting to common law concepts,
made available by section 1-103 of the Code.' Other authors have
also attempted to find a solution to his type of problem by resorting
A buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection (1) of Section 1-201) other than a
person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming operations takes
free of a security interest created by his seller even though the security interest is
perfected and even though the buyer knows of its existence.
10 See Bank of Utica v. Castle Ford, Inc, 36 App. Div. 2d 6, 317 N.Y.S. 2d 542, 8 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 910 (4th Dept. 1971); Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 290 A.2d 648, 10
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 523 (Del. 1972).
11 U.C.C. § 103 states:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and
equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract,
principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake,
bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its
provisions.
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to § 1-103 and § 2-403.12 The principal argument offered is that the
common law "shelter principle" would protect the innocent consumer. The shelter principle states' that the buyer would get all of
the rights that his seller had or could convey.' 3 Professor Clark himself, however, states that the "created by his seller" language "is the
reverse of the 'shelter' rule" (p. 3-23) and an "exception to the rule of
§ 9-307(1), which in general protects the reliance interest of a goodfaith buyer from a dealer" (p. 3-24). The shelter principle may not
be available as an adjunct of § 9-307.14 Professor Clark should have
pursued this point further.
Part Two of The Law of Secured TransactionsUnder the Uniorm Commercial Code focuses on the interplay of federal law, in particular
bankruptcy law, and Article Nine. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of
197815 [hereinafter Reform Act] is set out in its historical context.
For example, the manifold powers of the trustee are developed, explained, and contrasted with those under the previous Bankruptcy
Act of 189816 [hereinafter Bankruptcy Act]. Professor Clark, once
again, does an excellent job of focusing on the problems within the
Reform Act and offers sound advice as to how these problem areas
should be avoided or cleared up.
Professor Clark's discussion of the floating lien provides a good
example of his treatment of bankruptcy issues. 17 Professor Clark introduces us to the floating lien problem and its resolution under the
Bankruptcy Act (p. 6-32). He then lays out the Reform Act's treat12 See Dugan, Buyer-Secured Party Conficts Under Section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 48 U. COLO. L. REv. 333 (1975). See also Knapp, Protectingthe Buyer of Previousy Encumbered Goods Another Pleafor Revision of .CC. Section 9-307(1), 15 ARIZ. L. REv. 861 (1973).
13 A version of the shelter principle is contained in U.C.C. § 2-403(1).
14 U.C.C. § 9-306(2) makes it clear that the security interest continues no matter what
the disposition of the collateral, when it states: "Except where this Article provides. . ." (emphasis added), which in my opinion means that the only applicable exception is § 9-307.
U.C.C. § 9-307(1) is an exception, but it is specifically limited as to its application.
15 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pat. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 11 U.S.C. §§ 11160 (Supp. 1978).
16 Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, as amended, by Act of July 22,
1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840.
17 The "floating lien" is best described as follows:
Assume that a bank is willing to lend a retailer enough money to which the retailer
may purchase her inventory, i.e., goods for resale. It is clear to both parties that the
inventory purchased with the loan is intended to be sold to third parties. It is also
clear that some of the proceeds from the sales will be paid to the bank while some of
it will be used to purchase additional inventory. The bank will wish to have its
security interest extend to the after-acquired inventory. This interest that it has in
the after-acquired inventory is deemed to be a lien which floats over all to which it
is subject.
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ment of the floating lien and explains how Congress intended the
Reform Act to provide an "ultimate" solution to the floating lien
problem which had been so troublesome under the Bankruptcy Act
(p. 6-43). He then proceeds to show how new problems have been
created (p. 6-44).
Professor Clark identifies one of these problems as the Reform
Act's "improvement of position test" to resolve "after-acquired collateral" issues in the context of the floating liens.1 8 This test mandates comparison of the difference between value of the collateral
and the debt on the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy
with the difference between the value of the collateral and the debt
on the 90th day1 9 prior to that filing. If the creditor has improved his
position between those two dates by this measure, he is deemed to
have been preferred by the amount by which he has been improved,
thereby enabling the trustee to claim the improvement (preference)
for the estate.2 0 This test, however, contains valuation problems
which can cause nightmares. 2 1 Professor Clark adequately treats the
various problems, though he could have gone further in elaborating
on his proposed results in these situations.
Part Three makes perhaps Professor Clark's most substantial
contribution to all who work with Article Nine. Here Professor Clark
outshines the work of White and Summers by dissecting Article Nine
as it "applies to specific transactions."
Part Three closely scrutinizes the kinds of property which may
be pledged and the intricacies of the pledge as a security device. In
addition, this part discusses in great detail a number of non-possessory financing arrangements, including agricultural financing (p. 81), with its special rules (p. 8-6), equipment financing (p. 9-1), and
the special multi-state problems which an equipment creditor must
face (p. 9-6), financing accounts and inventory (p. 10-11), and the
special problem of the floating lien in these types of collateral (p. 102), executory contracts (p. 11-1), and the assignability problems (pp.
11-6), consumer credit transactions with special emphasis on debtor
rights upon default (supplementing the chapter on default in Part
One) (p. 12-1), and finally, oil and gas financing (p. 13-1), with the
conflict of personal property versus real estate (p. 13-4).
In this part of the book, Professor Clark seems primarily con18 Section 547c(5) of Reform Act.
19 See Section 547 of Reform Act (for insiders it would be one year, not 90 days).
20 Section 547c(5) of Reform Act.
21 Cohen, "Value"Judgments: Accounts Receivable Financing and Voidable Preferences Under the
New Bankmptt , Code, 66 MINN. L. REv. 639 (1982).
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cerned with the practitioner. He develops the myriad of problems
that arise in applying Article Nine to particular financing arrangements with a view to helping the practitioner avoid the pitfalls of
each type of transaction (pp. 12-22 to 12-80). However, in this part
all users get an opportunity to test the concepts introduced earlier in
the book.
Part Three's essence can be captured in a section on the Agricultural Financing where the author states that "[i]n light of the tremendous burst of litigation involving the farm products exception under
§ 9-307, the following bits of advice seem appropriate for the secured
lender. . ."(p. 8-36). He then proceeds to list his advice and concludes "the purchasers' case will be enhanced by . . . [tips]" (p. 8-

36). However:
In this writer's view, the farm products exception is hard to justify
on the merits. It has led to a welter of litigation that reflects confusion and lack of uniformity. Farmers and ranchers are big kids
these days. The farm products exception treats them like innocent
consumers. It smacks of paternalism in the same way as the 1962
Code's prohibition against after-acquired property clauses covering
crops. The crop provision was deleted in the 1972 version of Article
9. The farm products exception in the § 9-307 should also be deleted by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. If federal
lending agencies such as FHA seek to reinstate the exception in
Congress, the policy issue should be aired in that forum (p. 8-38).
Lastly, the 1962 version of the Code created many glaring
problems. In response to this, the 1972 official text was promulgated
and presented to the states. Part Four explains the extent and nature
of each change. All changes are dealt with in the order in which one
would discuss them in Article 9, with explanations for each. Once
again, Professor Clark does not simply lay out the material but uses
this part of his book to drive home the impact of the 1972 changes on
particular types of financing arrangements.
The Appendices contain two sections of interest to researchers.
Appendix B contains the General Comment on the "Approach of the
Review Committee for Article Nine." This provides ready access for
practitioner and the student of Article Nine to the words of the parties authoring the 1972 changes. Appendix C contains a table of
state variations of Article Nine. This is an essential table for the
practitioner who after all, must deal with the actual law of actual
states.
Professor Clark has put together an excellent resource book. He
has managed to understand the needs of his audience by focusing on
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their different needs and perspectives. The law student is brought
along slowly and carefully and is given all of the information necessary to understand the nature of an Article Nine transaction. The
law professor can learn from Professor Clark's methodology. The law
teacher is also challenged by Professor Clark's own judgments and
interpretations. As a law teacher himself, he understands the law
teacher's perspective and he strives, with success, to build up a difficulty level which allows the teacher to build on the base he sets
down. The practitioner is given sound advice on how to protect his
or her client's interests. Professor Clark makes sure that the various
transactions are dissected in such a way as to give the practitioner
options on how to proceed. Finally the judge is exposed to a scholarly endeavor which will be of value in attempting to make decisions
and.interpret the law.

